This policy paper examines the evolving security and governance crisis in northern Kosovo through the lens of institutional participation by the Serbian community. Since the coordinated withdrawal of Serb representatives from Kosovo’s police, judiciary, and municipal structures in November 2022, northern Kosovo has faced a prolonged institutional vacuum. The absence of trusted and ethnically representative institutions has exacerbated legal uncertainty, weakened public safety, and undermined efforts at sustainable integration. This paper analyzes the roots of the crisis, the consequences of institutional disengagement, and offers recommendations for re-establishing legitimacy and functionality through political compromise and inclusive reintegration.
The crisis did not emerge in isolation. It was triggered by a sequence of political and legal decisions, notably the Government of Kosovo’s enforcement of license plate regulations, which were perceived by the Serbian community as unilateral and provocative. These actions, coupled with Belgrade’s rejection of Pristina’s approach and demands for the formation of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities, laid the groundwork for the boycott. However, beyond immediate triggers, the crisis reflects a deeper structural issue: the fragile and conditional nature of Serb participation in Kosovo institutions, historically treated as a tactical rather than strategic engagement.
The security implications have been particularly severe. The resignation of over 570 Serb police officers created an immediate operational gap that was filled by special police units perceived as lacking both legitimacy and local understanding. Reports of excessive force and ethnic profiling further alienated the Serb population. At the same time, over 100 Serb judges, prosecutors, and court staff resigned, effectively paralyzing the judiciary in the north and undermining the rule of law. Although legal provisions exist for reinstating judicial personnel, the Kosovo government has resisted such moves, citing legal constraints, and has instead launched new recruitment processes—approaches perceived by many in the Serbian community as dismissive of political context.
Efforts to restore governance through elections have also faltered. Extraordinary mayoral elections in 2023 proceeded with extremely low Serb turnout (approximately 3.5%), resulting in ethnic Albanian mayors governing Serb-majority municipalities. A subsequent 2024 referendum aimed at removing these mayors failed due to another boycott. However, the February 2025 parliamentary elections marked a shift: Serb political parties, including Srpska Lista, re-entered the electoral process, securing nine Assembly seats. This move may indicate a strategic reassessment, suggesting a return to institutional engagement as the more effective path for advancing community interests.
The paper concludes that Kosovo’s legalistic responses, while procedurally sound, have failed to address the fundamentally political nature of the crisis. Belgrade’s demand for blanket reinstatement, meanwhile, lacks legal nuance. The stalemate continues to harm communities on the ground. The report recommends reframing reintegration as a political priority within the Brussels dialogue, particularly in the security and judicial sectors. A hybrid model for police reinstatement, immediate judicial reintegration, increased ethnic representation, civil society oversight, and inclusive electoral processes are identified as critical next steps. With local elections scheduled for autumn 2025, a window remains open – but closing – for rebuilding legitimacy and institutional trust in northern Kosovo.
The entire publication can be found HERE.
